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CALIFORNIA WESTERN LAW REVIEW
VOLUME 23 SPRING 1987 NUMBER 2
Negligence Liability of Landowners and Occupiers
for the Criminal Conduct of Another: On a Clear
Day in California One Can Foresee Forever
SIGFREDO A. CABRERA*
INTRODUCTION
Over the past several years, a disturbing phenomenon has been
gaining momentum in the tort liability arena. In this era of vic-
tims' rights awareness,' the judiciary has increasingly given recog-
nition to potential civil liability of third persons for negligently
failing to protect a victim from the criminal conduct of another.
This trend entails the use of traditional negligence standards2 in
alleging that the omissions of a third party caused the injury.'
* Research Director, Criminal Justice Legal Foundation, Sacramento, California.
B.A., California State University, Sacramento 1981; J.D., University of California, Davis
1984.
1. See generally Carrington, Victims' Rights Litigation: A Wave of the Future?, 11
U. RICH. L. REV. 447 (1977).
2. The negligence cause of action has traditionally been divided into four basic ele-
ments. Briefly stated, they are:
1. A duty, or obligation, recognized by the law, requiring the person to conform to
a certain standard of conduct, for the protection of others against unreasonable
risks.
2. A failure on the person's part to conform to the standard required: a breach of
the duty ....
3. A reasonably close causal connection between the conduct and the resulting
injury. This is what is commonly known as "legal cause," or "proximate cause,"
and which includes the notion of cause in fact.
4. Actual loss or damage resulting to the interests of another ....
W. KEETON, PROSSER & KEETON ON THE LAW OF TORTS § 30, at 164-65 (5th ed. 1984).
3. See Note, California Approach to Third Party Liability for Criminal Violence,
13 Loy. L.A.L. REV. 535 (1980); Comment, Negligence Liability for the Criminal Acts of
Another, 15 J. MARSHALL L. REV. 459 (1982); Harper & Kime, The Duty to Control the
Conduct of Another, 43 YALE L.J. 886 (1934); Annotation, Comment Note-Private Per-
son's Duty and Liability for Failure to Protect Another against Criminal Attack by Third
Person, 10 A.L.R. 3D 619 (1966). Typically, the victim elects to sue a more financially
stable third party rather than seek recovery from the perpetrator who is often indigent.
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Compensation in these "third party" suits is contingent on the vic-
tim's establishing a legal duty on the part of the third party to
protect the victim and proving that breach of the duty brought
about the victim's injuries. The task of determining whether an
affirmative duty of protection exists frequently involves identifying
a special relationship between the victim and the third party.4 An-
other approach adopted by courts is to balance competing policy
considerations.5
As this Article will illustrate, however, the decisions of the Cali-
fornia courts in this area of the law, as specifically applied to
landowners and occupiers, are poorly reasoned. Addressing the
problem more generally, one author has summarized the situation
as follows:
The problem with victims' litigation lies in the judiciary's incon-
sistent recognition of the duty to protect. The irregular applica-
tion of the special relationship rule, the failure of courts to an-
nounce exactly what makes a relationship special, and the role
of policy considerations in the judicial analysis of negligence
have led to inconsistent and sometimes unjust results. Conse-
quently, a strain has been placed on the traditional notion of
duty in suits against third parties for the failure to protect
against the criminal acts of another. 6
An examination of the most recent cases reveals a slim prospect
for improvement unless the legislature acts to provide statutory
4.
As a general principle, a "defendant owes a duty of care to all persons who are
foreseeably endangered by his conduct, with respect to all risks which make the
conduct unreasonably dangerous." ... [Hlowever, when the avoidance of foresee-
able harm requires a defendant to control the conduct of another person, or to
warn of such conduct, the common law has traditionally imposed liability only if
the defendant bears some special relationship to the dangerous person or to the
potential victim.
Tarasoff v. Regents of Univ. of Cal., 17 Cal. 3d 425, 434-35, 551 P.2d 334, 342-43, 131
Cal. Rptr. 14, 22-23 (1976) (quoting Rodriguez v, Bethlehem Steel Corp., 12 Cal. 3d 382,
399, 525 P.2d 669, 680, 115 Cal. Rptr. 765, 776 (1974)). See also Davidson v. City of
Westminster, 32 Cal. 3d 197, 203, 649 P.2d 894, 897, 185 Cal. Rptr. 252, 255 (1982): "A
person who has not created a peril is not liable in tort merely for failure to take affirmative
action to assist or protect another unless there is some relationship between them which
gives rise to a duty to act." See also Peterson v. San Francisco Community College Dist.,
36 Cal. 3d 799, 806, 685 P.24 1193, 1196, 205 Cal. Rptr. 842, 845 (1984); Lopez v.
Southern Cal. Rapid Transit Dist., 40 Cal. 3d 780, 789, 710 P.2d 907, 912, 221 Cal. Rptr.
840, 845 (1985); W. KEETON, supra note 2, § 56, at 373-85; RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF
TORTS § 315, at 122 (1965). The question of the existence of a legal duty of care in a given
factual situation presents a question of law which must be determined only by the court.
W. KEETON. supra note 2, § 37, at 236. Fee also 4 WITKIN, SUMMARY OF CALIFORNIA
LAW Torts § 493, at 2756 (8th ed. 1974).
5. See, e.g., Isaacs v. Huntington Memorial Hosp., 38 Cal, 3d 112, 124-25, 695 P.2d
653, 657-58, 211 Cal. Rptr. 356, 360-61 (1985), and cases cited therein; Cohen v. South-
land Corp., 157 Cal. App. 3d 130, 138-39, 203 Cal. Rptr. 572, 576 (1984); Gomez v.
Ticor, 145 Cal. App. 3d 622, 627, 193 Cal. Rptr. 600, 603 (1983).
6. Comment, supra note 3, at 463.
[Vol. 23
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guidance to the courts in establishing this legal responsibility. This
Article will expose the anomaly created when the courts define the
protective duty primarily in terms of "foreseeability" and allow
the jury to be the principal arbiters of that legal, not factual, de-
termination. Furthermore, this Article will make suggestions as to
the content of legislation needed to remedy this practice.
I. THE ROLE OF DUTY IN NEGLIGENCE ANALYSIS
In a negligence analysis, "duty" may be defined as "an obliga-
tion, to which the law will give recognition and effect, to conform
to a particular standard of conduct toward another."' Duty is a
question "of whether the defendant is under any obligation for the
benefit of the particular plaintiff; and in negligence cases, the duty
is always the same-to conform to the legal standard of reasona-
ble conduct in the light of the apparent risk. What the defendant
must do, or must not do, is a question of the standard of conduct
required to satisfy the duty." 8
According to Professor Fleming, the functional importance of
this concept
lies in the fact that it gives the court a powerful control over the
handling of negligence actions before a jury. For, even if there is
sufficient evidence for a finding of negligence against the defend-
ant, the court may still keep the case from the jury on the
ground that, as a matter of law, there was no duty incumbent on
the defendant to exercise care. Accordingly, the question
whether a duty exists in the particular situation involves a deter-
mination of law for the court. This control device is an impor-
tant factor in assuring consistency in the common law and serves
as a brake upon the proclivity of juries to indulge their sympa-
thy for accident victims without due regard for the wider impli-
cations of their findings in restricting freedom of action."
At this point, two significant California Supreme Court deci-
sions bear mentioning: Dillon v. Legg' ° and Rowland v. Chris-
tian.11 In Dillon, the California Supreme Court overruled its ear-
lier ruling in Amaya v. Home Ice, Fuel and Supply Co. 12 and
established a broader rule of liability which permitted a plaintiff
to recover damages for fear and shock suffered as a result of dan-
gerous conduct directed at someone other than the plaintiff. The
case involved a mother who had witnessed her child killed by a
7. W. KEETON, supra note 2, § 53, at 356.
8. Id.
9. J. FLEMING. THE LAW OF TORTS 135 (5th ed, 1977).
10. 68 Cal. 2d 728, 441 P.2d 912, 69 Cal. Rptr. 72 (1968).
11. 69 Cal. 2d 108, 443 P.2d 561, 70 Cal. Rptr. 97 (1968).
12. 59 Cal. 2d 295, 379 P.2d 513, 29 Cal. Rptr. 33 (1963).
1987]
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negligent automobile driver. That the driver was liable for the
wrongful death of the son was not disputed. The central question
involved the basis for the plaintiff's request for additional compen-
sation for the emotional damage she suffered because she wit-
nessed the event. In ruling in the plaintiff's favor, the court first
held that the conventional approach to legal duty no longer was
acceptable."3 The court then adopted an approach which focused
on the foreseeability of the risk of harm created by the defend-
ant's conduct.' 4
The Dillon court described duty as
a shorthand statement of a conclusion, rather than an aid to
analysis in itself.... But it should be recognized that "duty" is
not sacrosanct in itself, but only an expression of the sum total
of those considerations of policy which lead the law to say that
the particular plaintiff is entitled to protection. 15
The court further found that absent "overriding policy considera-
tions ... foreseeability of risk [is] of primary importance in estab-
lishing the element of duty."' 6 Applying this test, the Dillon court
held that a motorist should be able to foresee the emotional dam-
age that may be caused to a close relative of the person injured by
his negligent action. Consequently, the tortfeasor should be held
liable for compensation for these damages as well as the damages
he directly caused.
Two months later, the court again reexamined California negli-
gence law, this time in the context of premises liability.' Prior to
the California Supreme Court's decision in Rowland v. Christian,
California courts traditionally labelled a plaintiff either an invitee,
a licensee or a trespasser as a means of ascertaining the nature of
the duty owed by the occupant.' 8 In 1968, the California Supreme
Court repudiated that traditional duty classification scheme and
replaced it with the ordinary negligence principles of foreseeable
risk and reasonable care.' 9
13. Dillon, 68 Cal. 2d at 733-36, 441 P.2d at 916-18, 69 Cal. Rptr. at 76-78. The
former rule denied recovery where the fear or shock resulted from danger to someone other
than the plaintiff. This policy was articulated in Reed v. Moore, 156 Cal. App. 2d 43, 45,
319 P.2d 80, 81 (1957), and subsequently affirmed in Amaya v. Home Ice, Fuel and Sup-
ply Co., 59 Cal. 2d 295, 299, 379 P.2d 513, 515, 29 Cal. Rptr. 33, 35 (1963).
14. Dillon, 68 Cal. 2d at 739-40, 441 P.2d at 919-20, 69 Cal. Rptr. at 79-80.
15. Id. at 734, 441 P.2d at 916, 69 Cal. Rptr. at 76.
16. Id. at 739, 441 P.2d at 919, 69 Cal. Rptr. at 79.
17. Rowland v. Christian, 69 Cal. 2d 108, 443 P.2d 561, 70 Cal. Rptr. 97 (1968).
18. See generally W.KEETON, supra note 2, §§ 57-62.
19.
The proper test to be applied to the liability of the possessor of land.., is whether
in the management of his property he has acted as a reasonable man in view of
the probability of injury to others, and, although the plaintiff's status as a tres-
passer, licensee, or invitee may in the light of the facts giving rise to such status
[Vol. 23
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In Rowland, the plaintiff was injured when the handle of a por-
celain water faucet in the bathroom broke in his hand while he
was turning it. The plaintiff, a guest in the defendant's apartment
at the time of the injury, had informed her of his intention to use
the bathroom. The defendant knew that the handle was cracked
but failed to warn him of this condition. The trial court granted
the defendant's motion for summary judgment, applying the gen-
eral rule that a social guest is only a licensee and that the posses-
sor owes no duty to warn him of a dangerous condition.
In reversing this decision, the supreme court examined the com-
mon law in regard to liability of an occupier of land as applied in
California and concluded that section 1714 of the California Civil
Code20 served as the foundation of the state's negligence law. The
proper test, according to the court, was not the status of the plain-
tiff, but whether the injury was a foreseeable result of the host's
negligence.21 The Rowland opinion set forth broad criteria that
would be weighed in each set of factual circumstances to deter-
mine whether the duty of care should be expanded beyond tradi-
tional limits:
A departure from this fundamental principle involves the bal-
ancing of a number of considerations; the major ones are the
foreseeability of harm to the plaintiff, the degree of certainty
that the plaintiff suffered injury, the closeness of the connection
between the defendant's conduct and the injury suffered, the
moral blame attached to the defendant's conduct, the policy of
preventing future harm, the extent of the burden to the defend-
ant and consequences to the community of imposing a duty to
exercise care with resulting liability for breach, and the availa-
bility, cost, and prevalence of insurance for the risk involved.22
The Rowland court's statement is a comprehensive and authori-
tative exposition of the elements to be taken into account in deter-
mining whether a given relationship between parties comes within
the sphere of relationships on which a tort suit can be based.23
Unfortunately, this methodology, bolstered by the principles enun-
have some bearing on the question of liability, the status is not determinative.
Rowland, 69 Cal 2d. at 119, 443 P.2d at 568, 70 Cal. Rptr. at 104.
20. The 1978 amendment to CAL. CIv. CODE § 1714 designated the statutory lan-
guage applied in Rowland to be subdivision (a) and added subdivisions (b) and (c). Section
1714(a) now provides:
Every one is responsible, not only for the result of his willful acts, but also for an
injury occasioned to another by his want of ordinary care or skill in the manage-
ment of his property or person, except so far as the latter has, willfully or by want
of ordinary care, brought the injury upon himself...
21. See supra note 20.
22. Rowland, 69 Cal. 2d at 112-13, 443 P.2d at 564, 70 Cal. Rptr. at 100.
23. REPORT OF THE CALIFORNIA CITIZEN'S COMMISSION ON TORT REFORM, RIGHT-
ING THE LIABILITY BALANCE, 58 (1977) [hereinafter REPORT].
1987]
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ciated in Dillon v. Legg, has been repeatedly adopted, with consid-
erable confusion, in the context of "third party" premises liability
for criminal violence. Consistent with the current legal trend of
increasing the likelihood of liability of owners and occupiers of
land, the California decisions24 all too frequently emphasize pol-
icy-particularly the foreseeability factor-in considering the
duty to protect.25 A more analytically sound approach, however,
would focus on the nature of the relationship between the victim
and the landowner.2" To appreciate the import of this proposition,
a brief historical review of the special relationship doctrine is
necessary.
II.. THE SPECIAL RELATIONSHIP DOCTRINE
Ordinarily, a person who has not created a peril is not liable for
failure to take affirmative action to assist or protect another, no
matter how great the danger or how easily the endangered party
could be rescued. An exception to this general rule occurs when
there is some special relationship between the parties which gives
rise to a duty to act.27 Similarly,
[t]here is no duty so to control the conduct of a third person as
to prevent him from causing physical harm to another unless (a)
a special relation exists between the actor and the third person
which imposes a duty upon the actor to control the third per-
son's conduct, or (b) a special relation exists between the actor
and the other which gives to the other a right to protection.2 8
This principle is based on the notion that an individual should
not be liable for failing to act as a "good Samaritan."2 "Morally
24. See supra note 5.
25. Comment, supra note 3, at 463. See also infra notes 106-17 and accompanying
text.
26. See Harper & Kime, supra note 3.
27. B. WITKIN, supra note 4, § 554, at 2821; Lopez v. Southern Cal. Rapid Transit
Dist., 40 Cal. 3d 780, 788-89, 710 P.2d 907, 911-12, 221 Cal. Rptr. 840, 844-85 (1985);
Peterson v. San Francisco Community College Dist., 36 Cal. 3d 799, 806, 685 P.2d 1193,
1196, 205 Cal. Rptr. 842, 845 (1984); Williams v. State of Cal., 34 Cal. 3d 18, 23, 664
P.2d 137, 139, 192 Cal. Rptr. 233, 235 (1983); Davidson v. City of Westminster, 32 Cal.
3d 197, 203, 649 P.2d 894, 897, 185 Cal. Rptr. 252, 255 (1982); Thompson v. County of
Alameda, 27 Cal. 3d 741, 751-52, 614 P.2d 728, 733-34, 167 Cal. Rptr. 70, 75-76 (1980);
Tarasoff v. Regents of Univ. of Cal., 17 Cal. 3d 425, 435, 551 P.2d 334, 342-43, 131 Cal.
Rptr. 14, 22-23 (1976); Richards v. Stanley, 43 Cal. 2d 60, 65, 271 P.2d 23, 26-27 (1954).
An affirmative duty based on a special relationship should not be confused with one arising
by virtue of statute or contract. In this respect, see generally B. WITKIN, supra, §§ 562 and
566.
28. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 315 (1965) (quoted in Tarasoff, 17 Cal. 3d
at 435, 551 P.2d at 342-43, 131 Cal. Rptr. at 22-23; Thompson, 27 Cal. 3d at 751-52, 614
P.2d at 732-33, 167 Cal. Rptr. at 74-75).
29. Weirum v. RKO General, Inc., 15 Cal. 3d 40, 49, 539 P.2d 36, 41, 123 Cal.
Rptr. 468, 472 (1975).
[Vol. 23
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questionable, the rule owes its survival to 'the difficulties of setting
any standards of unselfish service to fellow men, and of making
any workable rule to cover possible situations where fifty people
might fail to rescue... ' "30 The rule has its roots in the common
law distinction between action and inaction, or misfeasance and
nonfeasance."a
Liability for nonfeasance . . . first appear[ed] in the case of
those engaged in "public" callings, who, by holding themselves
out to the public, were regarded as having undertaken a duty to
give service for the breach of which they were liable. With the
development of the action of assumpsit, [32] this principle was
extended to anyone who, for a consideration has undertaken to
perform a promise--or what we now call a contract. During the
last century, liability for "nonfeasance" has been extended still
further to a limited group of relations, in which custom, public
sentiment and views of social policy have led the courts to find a
duty of affirmative action.33
A special relationship, which gives rise to an initial duty to pro-
vide protection, has been found to exist, for example, between an
innkeeper and a guest,' a landlord and a tenant,35 an employer
and an employee, 36 and a carrier and a passenger.3
30. Tarasoff, 17 Cal. 3d at 435 n.5, 551 P.2d at 343 n.5, 131 Cal. Rptr. at 23 n.5
(quoting W. PROSSER, TORTS § 56, at 341 (4th ed. 1971)). See also, W. KEETON. supra
note 2, § 56, at 375-77; and J. FLEMING, supra note 10, at 143.
31.
Misfeasance exists when the defendant is responsible for making the plaintiff's
position worse, i.e., defendant has created a risk. Conversely, nonfeasance is found
when the defendant has failed to aid plaintiff through beneficial intervention....
[L]iability for nonfeasance is largely limited to those circumstances in which some
special relationship can be established. If, on the other hand, the act complained
of is one of misfeasance, the question of duty is governed by the standards of
ordinary care ....
Weirum, 15 Cal. 3d at 49, 539 P.2d at 41, 123 Cal. Rptr. at 473.
32. Assumpsit is a "common law form of action which lies for the recovery of dam-
ages for the non-performance of a parol or simple contract .... BLACK'S LAW DICTION-
ARY 112 (5th ed. 1979).
33. W. KEETON. supra note 2, § 56, at 373-74 (footnote omitted).
34. See generally Annotation, Liability of Hotel or Motel Operator for Injury to
Guest Resulting from Assault by Third Party, 28 A.L.R. 4TH 80 (1984); Annotation, Lia-
bility of Hotel or Motel for Guest's Loss of Money from Room by Theft or Robbery
Committed by Person Other Than Defendant's Servant, 28 A.L.R. 4TH 120 (1984).
35. See generally Annotation, Landlords's Obligation to Protect Tenant Against
Criminal Activities of Third Person, 43 A.L.R. 3D 331 (1972). See also O'Hare v. West-
ern Seven Trees Corp., 75 Cal. App. 3d 798, 142 Cal. Rptr. 487 (1977). Similarly, see
Frances T. v. Village Green Owners Ass'n, 42 Cal. 3d 490, 723 P.2d 573, 229 Cal. Rptr.
456 (1986)(Mosk, J., dissenting), where the court held that a condominium association and
its individual directors may be held to a landlord's standard of care as to the common areas
under their control and thus may be liable for injuries caused by third party criminal
conduct.
36. See generally Annotation, Employers Liability to Employee or Agent for Physi-
cal Injury Received as a Result of Assault by Third Party, 9 A.L.R. 3D 517 (1966). See
also Lillie v. Thompson, 332 U.S. 459 (1947).
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Some relationships are so tenuous, however, that no protective
duty will be deemed to exist despite a high degree of foreseeability
of harm. One example of such a relationship was found in David-
son v. City of Westminster.8 There, the plaintiff-victim was
stabbed while in a public laundromat that was under police sur-
veillance. On three prior occasions, women had been similarly as-
saulted at the same location. The investigating officers were aware
of the victim's presence throughout the surveillance but did not
warn her or intervene until the stabbing occurred. Seeking to re-
cover from the city and the policemen, the victim's complaint al-
leged that special relationships existed between her and the police-
man as well as between the assailant and the officers, each of
which imposed a duty of care on the officers.
The California Supreme Court held that there were no relation-
ships sufficient to impose a duty of care on the policemen. As be-
tween the officers and the assailant, the court wrote: "[A] person's
mere proximity to an assailant, even with knowledge of his as-
saultive tendencies or status as a felon, does not establish a rela-
tion imposing a duty to control the assailant's conduct." 9 Simi-
larly, the court held that no special relationship existed even
between the victim and the officers because the officers did not
create the peril, because the victim was unaware of the officers'
presence and did not rely on them for protection and because the
officers' conduct did not change the risk which would have existed
even in their absence.40 Moreover, the court rejected the victim's
argument that mere knowledge of her danger imposed a duty on
the officers to warn or protect her.41
Some relationships by their very nature are thus "special" ones
which give rise to an initial duty to come to the aid of others,42
while others are not special and do not give rise to such a duty.
Accordingly, in determining whether one owes an obligation to
protect another, the starting point of a "duty" analysis should nec-
37. See, e.g., Lopez v. Southern Cal. Rapid Transit Dist., 40 Cal. 3d 780, 788-89,
710 P.2d 907, 911-12, 221 Cal. Rptr. 840, 844-45 (1985).
38. 32 Cal. 3d 197, 649 P.2d 894, 185 Cal. Rptr. 252 (1982).
39. Id. at 205, 649 P.2d at 898, 185 Cal. Rptr. at 256.
40. Id. at 208, 649 P.2d at 900, 185 Cal. Rptr. at 258.
41. Id. at 209, 649 P.2d at 900, 185 Cal. Rptr. at 258.
42. Lopez, 40 Cal. 3d at 789, 710 P.2d at 912, 221 Cal. Rptr. at 845. This notion of
"initial duty" is to be differentiated from a duty arising as a result of a particularized
application of the "good Samaritan" doctrine which provides that a
volunteer who, having no initial duty to do so, undertakes to come to the aid of
another.., is under a duty to exercise due care in performance and is liable if (a)
his failure to exercise such care increases the risk of such harm, or (b) the harm is
suffered because of the other's reliance upon the undertaking.
Williams v. State of Cal., 34 Cal. 3d 18, 23, 664 P.2d 137, 139, 192 Cal. Rptr. 233, 235
(1983) (emphasis added).
[Vol. 23
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essarily begin with the question of the nature and character of the
particular relationship involved.4 3 Davidson v. City of Westmin-
ster 44 clarified that while harm to a plaintiff may be foreseeable,
that fact does not automatically create a protective duty. Once a
preexisting duty to protect is found by virtue of the particular re-
lationship, the concept of foreseeability should be used as an ana-
lytical tool in defining and limiting its scope. 5
Unfortunately, neither the California judiciary nor legislature
have articulated a working definition of "special relationship." In
Tarasoff v. Regents of the University of California,4" the Califor-
nia Supreme Court suggested that the proper approach in estab-
lishing a duty to protect another from criminal violence is to ex-
pand the list of special relationship exceptions rather than to
directly reject the general common law rule of non-liability.4 This
approach has been criticized, however, for failing to distinguish
various relationships from one another and for overlooking the
possibility that a central principle may be applicable to all "third
party" situations.4
Typically, where a special relationship exists, the plaintiff is in
some respect particularly vulnerable and dependent on the defend-
ant who, correspondingly, holds considerable power over the plain-
tiff's welfare.49 In the context of private duties, as opposed to gov-
ernmental duties, Marshall Shapo examined a series of continuing
relationships such as those stemming from employment, commer-
cial relations, educational environments and emergency situa-
tions.5 0 According to his thesis, affirmative duties are based pri-
43.
Duty arises out of a relation between the particular parties that in ... right reason
and essential justice enjoins the protection of one by the other against what the
law by common consent deems an unreasonable risk of harm, such as is reasona-
bly foreseeable . . . . Duty is largely grounded in the natural responsibilities of
social living and human relations such as have the recognition of reasonable men.
Mayer v. Housing Auth., 84 N.J. Super. 411, 420-21, 202 A.2d 439, 444 (Super. Ct. App.
Div. 1964), a.fd 210 A.2d 617 (N.J. 1965), (quoting Wytupeck v. Camden, 25 N.J. 450,
461, 136 A.2d 887, 893 (1957)).
44. 32 Cal. 3d 197, 649 P.2d 894, 185 Cal. Rptr. 252 (1982).
45. Note, Landlord's Duty to Protect Tenants from Criminal Acts of Third Parties:
The View from 1500 Massachusetts Avenue, 59 GEo. L.J. 1153, 1178 (1971). See also
Frances T. v. Village Green Owners Ass'n, 42 Cal. 3d 490, 523-24, 723 P.2d 573, 594, 229
Cal. Rptr. 456, 477 (1986) (Mosk, J., dissenting).
46. 17 Cal. 3d 425, 551 P.2d 334, 131 Cal. Rptr. 14 (1976).
47. Id. at 435 n.5, 551 P.2d at 343 n.5, 131 Cal. Rptr. at 23 n.5.
48. Note, supra note 3, at 552.
49. W. KEETON, supra note 2, § 56, at 374. See also J. FLEMING, supra note 10, at
147: Given a special relationship, "the law has long come to attach exceptional obligations
of protective care, because of the peculiar vantage by one party to such a relation in
preventing accidents and a corresponding dependence by the other on such help."
50. M. SHAPO. THE DUTY TO ACT: TORT LAW, POWER AND PUBLIC POLICY (1977).
1987]
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marily on a concept of power. "Power," as used in his text,
includes physical force and the ability to use various forms of
energy in ways that exercise effective control of people's desti-
nies in particular transactions or circumstances.... The princi-
pal hypothesis is that power relationships provide meaningful ex-
planations of desirable results in these cases-not an exclusive
analytical vehicle, but one that enables us to understand the
goals of the legal system more clearly, particularly with refer-
ences to the relation of this area of law to considerations of pub-
lic policy. 51
Therefore, power, control, submission and dependence should be
the criteria for labeling a relationship "special." 52
Illustrative of this concept is the case of Kline v. 1500 Massa-
chusetts Avenue Apartment Corp.53 There, the plaintiff was as-
saulted and robbed in the common hallway of an apartment build-
ing. The court held that the landlord of a large urban multiple
dwelling house owes a duty to take steps to protect tenants from
foreseeable criminal acts committed by third parties. The signifi-
cance of the decision lies in Judge Wilkey's analytical approach in
ruling that the landlord owed a protective duty to the tenant. Ac-
cording to the opinion, this initial duty arises
from the logic of the situation itself.... As between tenant and
landlord, the landlord is the only one in the position to take the
necessary acts of protection required .... Not only as between
landlord and tenant is the landlord best equipped to guard
against the predictable risk of intruders, but even as between
landlord and the police power of government, the landlord is in
the best position to take the necessary protective measures. Mu-
nicipal police cannot patrol the entryways and the hallways, the
garages and the basement of private multiple unit apartment
dwellings. They are neither equipped, manned, nor empowered
to do so.5
In short, "[a] tenant in a typical multidwelling apartment surren-
ders his capacity for self-protection and almost entirely relies upon
the power and control of the landlord to assure his security."55
51. Id. at xiii-xiv.
52.
[L]iability for failure to provide protection from criminal behavior should not be
confined to [the] narrow margins of accepted relationships, but rather should in-
clude any social relationship where the capacity of one party to provide for his
own protection has been restricted by his submission to the control of another
party. From such a relationship a duty arises in the one possessing the control to
employ reasonable measures to protect the other party from criminal acts of third
persons which, in light of the circumstances, reasonably can be anticipated.
Note, supra note 45, at 1162.
53. 439 F.2d 477 (D.C. Cir. 1970)
54. Id. at 483-84.
55. Note, supra note 45, at 1164.
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Similarly, in holding that the common carrier-passenger rela-
tionship is "special," the California Supreme Court in Lopez v.
Southern California Rapid Transit District5" recognized that:
[B]us passengers are "sealed into a moving steel cocoon." Large
numbers of strangers are forced into very close physical contact
with one another under conditions that often are crowded, noisy,
and overheated. At the same time, the means of entering and
exiting the bus are limited and under the exclusive control of the
bus driver. Thus, passengers have no control over who is admit-
ted on the bus and, if trouble arises, are wholly dependent upon
the bus driver to summon help or provide a means of escape.
These characteristics of buses are, at the very least, conducive to
outbreaks of violence between passengers and at the same time
significantly limit the means by which passengers can protect
themselves from assaults by fellow passengers."
By far the largest single group on which the duty of affirmative
conduct has been imposed is owners and occupiers of land.58 As
previously noted, a private landowner's liability can be based on
the landowner's negligent conduct.5 It has also been recognized
that in the absence of a special relationship, the landowner is
under no duty to protect against the wrongful conduct of third
parties.60
56. 40 Cal. 3d 780, 710 P.2d 907, 221 Cal. Rptr. 840 (1985).
57. Id. at 789, 710 P.2d at 912, 221 Cal. Rptr. at 845. See also M. SHAPO, supra
note 50, at 18-19:
Particularly in the case of a common carrier, an entrustment factor intrudes into
the psychological background. The passenger is practically in the driver's care,
and the law should respond to the reality of the relationship.... The question...
lies... in a community sense of what is fair in the psychological context of trust
and dependence.
As Shapo further explained,
[i]t is true that in the immediate situation the driver is a victim of circumstance in
a world that he, like his passengers, did not make. But circumstance has thrust
power upon him, and if he does not respond to the demands of danger and depen-
dence, his employer must pay for injuries caused thereby.
Id. at 44.
Shapo noted similar analytical threads running through the relationship of innkeeper-guest:
In such cases liability rests not simply on bargain or even on risk-bearing capacity
but on a duty of fiduciary dimension .... The implicit feeling of security engen-
dered by a hotel's image leads the guest to seek refuge there; certainly, it deters
him from making independent arrangements for his personal security. Beyond
that, considerations of humanity enter. Not only entrustment by the guest of his
personal safety but also a bedrock obligation founded on a relationship in which
one person effectively has another's security in his care require the power holder
both to provide and to maneuver against the terror of potential criminal assault.
Id.
58. W. KEETON, supra note 2, § 56, at 374.
59. See discussion of Rowland v. Christian, supra notes 18-23 and accompanying
text.
60. See, e.g., Hayes v. State of Cal., I I Cal. 3d 469, 472 n.3, 521 P.2d 855, 857 n.3,
113 Cal. Rptr. 599, 601, n.3 (1974).
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Nevertheless, in Lopez v. Southern California Rapid Transit
District,"' the court stated that some relationships are
by their very nature "special" ones giving rise to an "initial
duty" to come to the aid of others, regardless of whether there
has been detrimental reliance in a particular case. The relation-
ship between . . .. a possessor of land and those who enter in
response to the landowner's invitation [is just such a relation-
ship] .... 62
As a preliminary matter, such a sweeping generalization over-
looks the fact that applying the special relationship doctrine in the
"landowner/occupier" context must necessarily take into consider-
ation the varied factual circumstances of cases involving this par-
ticular form of relationship.6 3 A mechanical application of the
doctrine to all landowner liability cases disregards those factual
elements which distinguish varying degrees of dependence, power
and control.
A careful analysis of the factual circumstances in those cases in
which an affirmative duty of protection has been held to exist
reveals that such a determination may be traced to some or all of
the following criteria:
(1) The extent to which the defendant's activities isolated the
plaintiff from the peacekeeping operations of law enforcement
personnel;
(2) the degree of power and control the defendant had over the
security and welfare of the plaintiff;
(3) the extent to which the plaintiff relinquished his right of self-
protection to the defendant;
(4) the extent to which the plaintiff made independent arrange-
ments for his personal security;
(5) the extent to which the defendant limited the plaintiff's free-
dom of action; and
(6) the period of time the relationship existed.
61. 40 Cal. 3d 780, 710 P.2d 907, 221 Cal. Rptr. 840 (1985).
62. Id. at 789, 710 P.2d at 912, 221 Cal. Rptr. at 845.
63. See, e.g., Annotation, Liability of Hotel or Motel for Guest's Loss of Money
from Room by Theft or Robbery Committed by Person Other Than Defendant's Servant,
28 A.L.R. 4TH 120 (1984); Annotation, Liability of Hotel or Motel Operator for Injury to
Guest Resulting from Assault by Third Party, 28 A.L.R. 4TH 80 (1984); Annotation,
Liability of Storekeeper for Injury to Customer Arising Out of Pursuit of Shoplifter, 14
A.L.R. 4TH 950 (1982); Annotation, Liability of University, College, or Other School for
Failure to Protect Student from Crime, 1 A.L.R. 4TH 1099 (1980); Annotation, Liability
of Owner or Operator of Shopping Center, or Business Housed Therein, for Injury to
Patron on Premises from Criminal Attack by Third Party, 93 A.L.R. 3D 999 (1979);
Annotation, Liability of Owner or Operator of Theatre or Other Amusement to Patron
Assaulted by Another Patron, 75 A.L.R. 3D 441 (1977); Annotation, Liability of Store-
keeper for Death or Injury to Customer in Course of Robbery, 72 A.L.R. 3D 1269 (1976);
Annotation, Liability of Bank for Injuries Sustained by Customer in Course of Bank Rob-
bery, 51 A.L.R. 3D 711 (1973).
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However, courts have begun treating landowner-occupier cases
differently, assuming, as in Lopez, that a special relationship ex-
ists without investigation. While this will certainly increase a
landowner's exposure, there has been a more radical modification
in such cases which will expand liability not only in those situa-
tions, but also potentially all cases involving harm to a plaintiff:
The jury is supplanting the court in finding that a duty exists
under the guise of foreseeability.
III. FORESEEABILITY: THE ROLE OF THE JUDGE AND THE JURY
IN NEGLIGENCE CASES
More significant than assuming the existence of a duty, the Cal-
ifornia judiciary has begun to rely almost exclusively on the con-
cept of foreseeability to determine whether there is a protective
duty. To fully appreciate the ramifications of this policy, review-
ing the roles played by the judge and jury in negligence cases is
helpful.
Two of the basic elements in a negligence cause of action are
duty and proximate cause. " Duty is defined as an obligation to
conform to a particular standard of conduct toward another.65
Duty is a determination of law for the court.66 Proximate cause,
on the other hand, has been described as a "limitation which the
courts have placed upon the actor's responsibility for the conse-
quences of the actor's conduct. ' 67 According to Judge Andrews in
his dissenting opinion in the famous Palsgraf case, "[w]hat we do
mean by the word 'proximate' is that because of convenience, of
public policy, of a rough sense of justice, the law arbitrarily de-
clines to trace a series of events beyond a certain point. This is not
logic. It is practical politics."6 8 Proximate cause generally has
been held to be a question of fact for the jury.69
64. See supra note 2.
65. See supra note 8 and accompanying text.
66. Weirum v. RKO General, Inc., 15 Cal. 3d 40, 46, 539 P.2d 36, 39, 123 Cal.
Rptr. 468, 471 (1975); Clarke v. Hoek, 174 Cal. App. 3d 208, 219 Cal. Rptr. 845 (1985).
67. W. Keeton, supra note 2, § 41, at 264.
In a philosphical sense, the consequences of an act go forward to eternity, and the
causes of an event go back to the dawn of human events, and beyond. But any
attempt to impose responsibility upon such basis wuld result in infinite liability for
all wrongful acts, and would "set society on edge and fill the courts with endless
litigation." As a practical matter, legal responsibility must be limited to those
causes which are so closely connected with the result and of such significance that
the law is justified in imposing liability.
Id. (quoting North v. Johnson, 58 Minn. 242, 59 N.W. 1012 (1894)).
68. Palsgraf v. Long Island Ry. Co., 248 N.Y. 339, 352, 162 N.E. 99, 103 (1928)
(Andrews, J., dissenting).
69. B. WITKIN, supra note 4, § 621, at 2903. See also Bigbee v. Pacific Tel. & Tel.
1987]
13
Cabrera: Negligence Liability of Landowners and Occupiers for the Criminal
Published by CWSL Scholarly Commons, 1986
178 CALIFORNIA WESTERN LAW REVIEW [Vol. 23
In the ordinary negligence case,70 "foreseeability of risk may be
treated, alternatively, as one of the multiple factors giving rise to
a duty of care, or as an element in the delineation of proximate
cause." 7' In the absence of overriding policy considerations, fore-
seeability of risk has been deemed to be of primary importance in
establishing the element of duty. 2 This does not, however, make
the determination of duty a question of fact. As noted in Clarke v.
Hoek,7 13
[w] hile it is in the province of the jury, as trier of fact, to deter-
mine whether an unreasonable risk of harm was foreseeable
under the particular facts of a given case, the trial court must
still decide as a matter of law whether there was a duty in the
first place, even if that determination includes a consideration of
foreseeability.74
In the context of "third party" premises liability for criminal
violence, however, the California courts are deciding the affirma-
tive duty issue by balancing competing policy considerations
rather than focusing on the nature of the particular relationship
involved. That is, the analysis of Rowland" and Dillon"6 has been
Co., 34 Cal. 3d 49, 56, 665 P.2d 947, 952-53, 192 Cal. Rptr. 857, 860-61 (1983). Where
the facts are undisputed, the question of proximate cause is occasionally regarded as one of
law. B. WITKIN. supra, at 2903.
70. In this sense, "ordinary" excludes those cases in which an "initial duty" to come
to the aid of others arises from a special relationship.
71. 46 CAL. JUR. 3D Negligence § 7, at 147 (1978) (footnote omitted).
[M]any of the circumstances involved in a consideration of the foreseeability of an
occurrence which will determine the existence of a duty on the part of the defend-
ant to exercise due care toward a particular plaintiff may be equally pertinent in
considering the test of foreseeability of an injury to determine whether a precedent
act of negligence proximately caused that injury.
Id. (footnote omitted). For an explanation of the variety of roles that foreseeability plays in
tort doctrine, see Ballard v. Uribe, 41 Cal. 3d 564, 572 n.6, 715 P.2d 624, 628 n.6, 224
Cal. Rptr. 664, 669 n.6 (1986) reh'g denied, May 29, 1986.
The concept of foreseeability is difficult to define precisely. Moreover, a great deal of
controversy exists among the legal commentators regarding its role in negligence analysis.
See, e.g., Dias, The Breach Problem and the Duty of Care, 30 TuLANE L. REV. 377
(1956); Dias, The Duty Problem in Negligence, 13 CAMBRIDGE L. 198 (1955); Fleming,
The Passing of Polemis, 39 CAN. BAR REV. 489 (1961); Goodhart, Liability and Compen-
sation, 76 LAW Q. REV. 567 (1960); Goodhart, The Imaginary Necktie and the Rule in Re
Polemis, 68 LAw Q. REV. 514 (1952); Green, Foreseeability in Negligence Law, 61
COLUM. L. REV. 1401 (1961); Payne, Foreseeability and Remoteness of Damage in Negli-
gence, 25 MOD. L. REV. 1 (1962); Payne, The "Direct" Consequences of a Negligent Act, 5
CURR. LEGAL PROB. 189 (1952); Williams, The Risk Principle, 77 LAW Q. L. REV. 179
(1961); Wilson & Salde, A Re-examination of Remoteness, 15 MOD. L. REV. 458 (1952);
Wright, Re Polemis, 14 MoD. L. REV. 393 (1951).
72. Weirum v. RKO General, Inc., 15 Cal. 3d 40, 46, 539 P.2d 36, 39, 123 Cal.
Rptr. 468, 471 (1975); Dillon v. Legg, 68 Cal. 2d 728, 739, 441 P.2d 912, 919, 69 Cal.
Rptr. 72, 79 (1968).
73. 174 Cal. App. 3d 208, 219 Cal. Rptr. 845 (1985).
74. Id. at 214, 219 Cal. Rptr. at 849 (citation omitted).
75. Rowland v. Christian, 69 Cal. 2d 108, 443 P.2d 561, 70 Cal. Rptr. 97 (1968).
76. Dillon v. Legg, 68 Cal. 2d 728, 441 P.2d 912, 69 Cal. Rptr. 72 (1968).
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grafted to those cases involving landowners/occupiers and the visi-
tors who were injured as a result of the criminal acts of others.7
Yet, those decisions do not address the issue of duty to aid others.
More significantly, foreseeability has now become the focal point
of the duty analysis and is being decided entirely by the jury.
A recent example of this analysis can be found in Isaacs v.
Huntington Memorial Hospital.78 There, the plaintiff, an anesthe-
siologist affiliated with a private hospital, filed a lawsuit against
the hospital and its insurer to recover for severe injuries sustained
as a result of a gunshot wound inflicted by an unknown assailant
in one of the hospital's parking lots. The plaintiff alleged that the
hospital had failed to provide adequate security measures to pro-
tect its visitors against the criminal acts of other persons on its
premises. He also alleged that the insurance carrier had been neg-
ligent for participating in the hospital's decision to disarm its se-
curity guards which had directly contributed to the inadequacy of
the security measures. The question presented was whether, in an
action against a landowner for criminal acts of persons on the
landowner's property, a plaintiff may establish foreseeability other
than by evidence of prior similar incidents on those premises.79
The court's discussion of the duty issue 0 presupposed that fore-
seeability is the gravamen of the duty determination in the "third
77. Many of the modern decisions have characterized Rowland as a major departure
from the classification of negligence as active or passive in favor of an approach in which
an affirmative duty of protection is grounded in the possession, control and management of
the premises. However, those decisions necessarily involved injury which directly resulted
from conditions on the land. See, e.g., Sprecher v. Adamson Companies, 30 Cal. 3d 358,
368, 636 P.2d 1121, 1126, 178 Cal. Rptr. 783, 788 (1981); Preston v. Goldman, 42 Cal. 3d
108, 118-19, 720 P.2d 476, 481-82, 227 Cal. Rptr. 817, 823 (1986). An injury incurred as
a result of the criminal conduct of another, on the other hand, may or may not be related
to a condition of the premises on which the incident took place. Therefore, it would be
anomalous to depart from the feasance/nonfeasance dichotomy in this context.
78. 38 Cal. 3d 112, 695 P.2d 653, 211 Cal. Rptr. 356 (1985).
79. Several prior California appellate court decisions had adopted the rule that "in
the absence of prior similar incidents, an owner of land is not bound to anticipate the
criminal activities of third persons, particularly where the wrongdoer was a complete stran-
ger to both the landowner and the victim and where the criminal activity leading to the
injury came about precipitously." Wingard v. Safeway Stores, Inc., 123 Cal. App. 3d 37,
43, 176 Cal. Rptr. 320, 323-24 (1981). See also Anaya v. Turk, 151 Cal. App. 3d 1092,
1099, 199 Cal. Rptr. 187, 190 (1984); Riley v. Marcus, 125 Cal. App. 3d 103, 109 & n.2,
177 Cal. Rptr. 827, 830-31 & n.2 (1981); Jamison v. Mark C. Bloome Co., 112 Cal. App.
3d 570, 578-80, 169 Cal. Rptr. 399, 402-04 (1980); Totten v. More Oakland Residential
Housing, Inc., 63 Cal. App. 3d 538, 543, 134 Cal. Rptr. 29, 33-34 (1976); Rogers v Jones,
56 Cal. App. 3d 346, 351-52, 128 Cal. Rptr. 404, 407 (1976): Jubert v. Shalom Realty,
135 Cal. App. 3d Supp. 1, 6, 185 Cal. Rptr. 641, 644 (1982). In Isaacs, however, the
California Supreme Court criticized the "prior incidents rule," preferring to adopt the
much broader test of foreseeability. The court stated that "[p]rior similar incidents are
helpful to determine foreseeability but they are not necessary." Isaacs, 38 Cal. 3d at 127,
695 P.2d at 659, 211 Cal. Rptr. at 362.
80. Isaacs, 38 Cal. 3d at 123, 695 P.2d at 657, 211 Cal. Rptr. at 360.
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party" premises liability area. In fact, the opinion reaffirmed Tay-
lor v. Centennial Bowl, Inc.,81 an earlier decision that specifically
determined the duty owed by a business proprietor to his business
invitees. In Taylor, the state supreme court held that the general
duty included
not only the duty to inspect the premises in order to uncover
dangerous conditions ... but, as well, the duty to take affirma-
tive action to control the wrongful acts of third persons which
threaten invitees where the occupant has reasonable cause to
anticipate such acts and the probability of injury resulting
therefrom.8"
Oddly enough, however, the Isaacs opinion added that "[t]his
duty is premised on the special relationship between the land-
owner and the invitee .... -83 The court nonetheless failed to
articulate those factors which make any given relationship special.
Rather, the court held that the trial court had erred in finding
that as a matter of law the attack on plaintiff was not foresee-
able 84 and so remanded the case for further proceedings.
In its opinion, the court enumerated the Rowland factors which
would be "weighed" to determine whether a duty existed.8 5 Yet
the question remains whether the basis of the duty is a special
relationship or the product of a "balancing" of social policy
considerations.
The most significant aspect of the Isaacs opinion is the broad
interpretation given the factor of "foreseeability." Quoting Harper
and James, the court characterized it as an "elastic factor"8' 6 and
criticized recent appellate rulings for having "rigidified the fore-
seeability concept in situations involving a landowner's liability for
the criminal acts of third persons against invitees. 87 Disapproving
their "rigid application of a mechanical 'prior similars' rule,"' 8
81. 65 Cal. 2d 114, 416 P.2d 793, 52 Cal. Rptr. 561 (1966).
82. Id. at 121, 416 P.2d at 797, Cal. Rptr. at 565 (emphasis added) (citation
omitted).
83. Isaacs, 38 Cal. 3d at 123, 695 P.2d at 657, 211 Cal. Rptr. at 360 (citation
omitted).
84. Id. at 130-31, 695 P.2d at 662, 211 Cal. Rptr. at 365.
85. Id. at 124-25, 695 P.2d at 662-63, 211 Cal. Rptr. at 361.
86. Id. at 125, 695 P.2d at 658, 211 Cal. Rptr. at 361 (quoting 2 HARPER & JAMES,
LAW OF TORTS § 18.2, at 1026 (1956)).
87. Isaacs, 38 Cal. 3d at 125, 695 P.2d at 658, 211 Cal. Rptr. at 361.
88. Id. at 126, 695 P.2d at 658, 211 Cal. Rptr. at 362. Specifically, the Isaacs court
criticized the "prior incidents" rule for (1) being unfair to "first victims" and for "discour-
aging landowners from taking adequate measures to protect premises which they know are
dangerous" (Id. at 125, 695 P.2d at 658, 211 Cal. Rptr. at 361); (2) leading to arbitrary
results and distinctions. "Under [the prior incidents] rule, there is uncertainty as to how
'similar' the prior incidents must be to satisfy the rule.... [H]ow close in time do the prior
incidents have to be? How near must they be in location?" (Id. at 126, 695 P.2d at 658-59,
211 Cal. Rptr. at 361-62); (3) "equatling] foreseeability of a particular act with previous
[Vol. 23
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the court greatly generalized the concept of foreseeability. Quot-
ing Bigbee v. Pacific Telephone & Telegraph Co.,8 9 the Isaacs
court wrote: "'[W]hat is required to be foreseeable is the general
character of the event or harm ... not its precise nature or man-
ner of occurrence.' "0 Thus, other types of evidence which may
also establish foreseeability include "the nature, condition and lo-
cation of defendants' premises." '91
Based on contemporary human experience, criminal activity can
be predicted with a significant degree of probability in certain sit-
uations."2 What is most disturbing about the characterization of
foreseeability in this case, however, is that foreseeability in effect
is used interchangeably with "possibility." In Kline v. 1500 Mas-
sachusetts Avenue Apartment Corp.,93 Judge Wilkey warned that
foreseeability should not be given such a construction for then ev-
eryone could foresee the perpetration of crimes by anyone, any-
where and at any moment.94 This is especially true in light of the
significant increase in crime during the last four decades. Instead,
foreseeability should be construed in terms of probability and
predictability.95
Cited and discussed with approval in Isaacs are Gomez v.
Ticor96 and Cohen v. Southland Corp.97 In Gomez, robbers shot
and killed a man as he was returning to his automobile which was
parked in an office building's parking structure. The plaintiffs
were the victim's survivors who brought a wrongful death action
against the owner of the parking structure, alleging that he negli-
gently failed to take reasonable precautions to prevent violent acts
occurrences of similar acts" (id. at 126, 695 P.2d at 659, 211 Cal. Rptr. at 362); and (4)
"improperly remov[ing] too many cases from the jury's consideration." (Id.)
89. 34 Cal. 3d 49, 665 P.2d 947, 192 Cal. Rptr. 857 (1983).
90. Isaacs, 38 Cal. 3d at 127, 695 P.2d at 659, 211 Cal. Rptr. at 362 (quoting
Bigbee, 34 Cal. 3d at 57-58, 665 P.2d at 952, 192 Cal. Rptr at 862).
91. Isaacs, 38 Cal. 3d at 129, 695 P.2d. at 661, 211 Cal. Rptr. at 364 (citing Gomez
v. Ticor, 145 Cal. App. 3d 622, 193 Cal. Rptr 600 (1985), and Cohen v. Southland Corp.,
157 Cal. App. 3d 130, 203 Cal. Rptr. 572 (1984)).
92. Comment, supra note 3, at 465.
93. 439 F.2d 477 (D.C. Cir. 1970).
94. The court in Goldberg v. Housing Auth., 38 N.J. 578, 186 A.2d 291 (1962),
interpreted "foreseeability" in this manner:
Everyone can foresee the commission of crime virtually anywhere and at anytime.
If foreseeability itself gave rise to a duty to provide "police" protection for others,
every residential curtilage, every shop, every store, every manufacturing plant
would have to be patrolled by the private arm of the owner. And since hijacking
and attack upon occupants of motor vehicles are also foreseeable, it would be the
duty of every motorist to provide armed protection for his passengers and the
property of others. Of course, none of this is at all palatable.
Id. at 578, 186 A.2d at 293. See also infra notes 136-37 and accompanying text.
95. Kline, 439 F.2d at 483.
96. 145 Cal. App. 3d 622, 193 Cal. Rptr. 600 (1983).
97. 157 Cal. App. 3d 130, 203 Cal. Rptr. 572 (1984).
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on patrons. In support of their allegation of negligence, the plain-
tiffs introduced affidavits attesting to the high-crime character of
the neighborhood and of specific instances of thefts as well as
other nonviolent crimes which had occurred in the building in the
three years preceding the attack. The trial court granted summary
judgment in favor of the owner.
In reversing this ruling, the court of appeal commenced its anal-
ysis of duty in a manner typical of most of the California deci-
sions: The court injected the issue of foreseeability into the issue
of duty and argued that because foreseeability is a question of fact
for the jury, the trial court's granting of summary judgment was
improper.98 Again, the responsibility of determining duty-a legal
determination-in effect was delegated to the jury. In fact, the
court took a backwards approach as indicated by its statement
that "'[plaintiffs' allegation of foreseeability, if confirmed by the
trier of fact, will support the finding of a minimal duty of
care."99 Furthermore, the court construed "foreseeability" in
terms of mere likelihood, thus making it easier for juries in future
cases to conclude that such incidents were the result of a defend-
ant's negligence. 100
A similar rationale was used in Cohen v. Southland Corp.101 in
which the court again rested its duty analysis on foreseeability.
There, a customer in a 7-11 store was shot while attempting to
prevent an armed robbery. In his complaint, the customer alleged
that the franchise owner, the franchisee and the employee all
failed to protect the store's patrons from assault or other threaten-
ing behavior of armed thieves. The court of appeal once again re-
versed an award of summary judgment in favor of the defendants.
In its discussion of the duty to protect owed by owners and occupi-
ers of land to their visitors, the court adopted the policy-oriented
98. Gomez, 145 Cal. App. 3d at 627, 193 Cal. Rptr. at 603 (citations omitted):
In California, it is well settled that an owner of land held open for business pur-
poses may have a duty to protect visitors from the wrongful acts of third persons..
. Whether such a duty in fact exists is a question of law to be determined sepa-
rately in each case, based on the weighing of a number of factors. . . . Most
important among these is the foreseeability of the harm.... Unlike duty, foresee-
ability is a question of fact, which must be decided by the jury in any case about
which reasonable minds can differ.... Accordingly, we first decide whether plain-
tiffs have raised a triable issue of foreseeability.
99. Id. at 629, 193 Cal. Rptr. at 604.
100. "The California Supreme Court has recently reiterated that '"foreseeability is
not to be measured by what is more probable than not, but includes whatever is likely
enough in the setting of modern life that a reasonable thoughtful person would take ac-
count of it in guiding practical conduct."' " Id. (quoting Bigbee v. Pacific Tel. & Tel. Co.,
34 Cal. 3d 49, 57, 665 P.2d 947, 952, 192 Cal. Rptr. 857, 862 (1983) (quoting HARPER &
JAMES, supra note 86, § 18.2, at 1020)). Subsequent to the ruling in Gomez, the defendant,
Ticor, paid $150,000 in settlement.
101. 157 Cal. App. 3d 130, 203 Cal. Rptr. 572 (1984).
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analysis first enunciated in Rowland v.Christian02 and acknowl-
edged that foreseeability of harm was of primary importance in
establishing the element of duty.10 3 Further, in the same breath,
the court reasoned that foreseeability "is ordinarily a question of
fact for the jury, and [is] 'decided as a question of law only if,
under the undisputed facts there is no room for a reasonable dif-
ference of opinion.' "o104 Given the judiciary's extreme reluctance
to remove any foreseeability question from the jury, the practical
effect of this analytical approach is to assign to the jury the sole
responsibility for determining the existence or non-existence of a
protective duty.10 5
IV. RAMIFICATIONS AND THE NEED FOR LEGISLATION
This current method of analysis in "third party" premises liabil-
ity cases is unsound for two reasons. First, such a process lends
itself to ad hoc decisions, making inconsistent results inevitable.106
A more equitable balancing of policy considerations would give
stronger emphasis to factors such as the moral blameworthiness of
the defendant's conduct and the closeness of the connection be-
tween his conduct and the injury suffered.107 Second, the courts
are not impartially considering all interests when they rely so
heavily on the element of foreseeability.10 8 The broad construction
that the courts have accorded this term means that almost any
criminal occurrence may be deemed foreseeable.
102. See supra note 22 and accompanying text.
103. Cohen, 157 Cal. App. 3d at 138, 203 Cal. Rptr. at 576.
104. Id. (quoting Bigbee, 34 Cal. 3d at 56, 665 P.2d at 950, 192 Cal. Rptr. at 860)
(emphasis added). Subsequent to the opinion in Cohen, plaintiff entered into a structured
settlement with defendants for an undisclosed amount.
105. See Clarke v. Hock, 174 Cal. App. 3d 208, 219 Cal. Rptr. 845 (1985).
106. Comment, supra note 3, at 471. Compare Cohen v. Southland Corp. with Gre-
gorian v. National Convenience Stores, Inc., 174 Cal. App. 3d 944, 220 Cal. Rptr. 302
(1985) (defendants, owners of a Stop 'N' Go Market, were under no duty to protect a
shopper from a sudden attack by a youth gang). See also Noble v. Los Angeles Dodgers,
Inc., 168 Cal. App. 3d 912, 915, 214 Cal. Rptr. 395, 397 (1985), where the court recog-
nized that
[c]ase law has taken a rather uncertain and non-uniform approach in providing
compensation by the property owner for victims of criminal activity occurring on
the property. Most of the reported decisions have dealt with cases at the pleading
stage or on appeal from a summary judgment in favor of the property owners, and
have varied in result according to a particular court's view of the plaintiff's allega-
tion concerning a "special" foreseeability which set the land owner apart from the
community at large.
107. Note, supra note 2, at 547.
108. See also Peterson v. San Francisco Community College Dist., 36 Cal. 3d 799,
806, 685 P.2d 1193, 1196, 205 Cal. Rptr. 842, 845 (1984) (female college student filed suit
against community college district for injuries sustained as a result of an attempted
daylight rape in the parking lot area of the campus).
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Recall that the concept of duty serves as a restraint on the pro-
clivity of juries to indulge their sympathy for injury victims with-
out due regard for the wider implication of their findings.109 The
current judicial expansion of duty is ensuring that the exact oppo-
site occurs: A landowner is frequently and unwarrantedly exposed
to liability.
At this point, it is important to emphasize that this critique is
not meant to imply that landowners should bear no responsibility
in the social fight to reduce the incidence of crime. Although citi-
zens traditionally have relied exclusively on the local police for
protection against the hazards of crime, law enforcement agencies
alone clearly cannot be expected to safeguard all persons from all
crimes today.
[E]very segment of society has obligations to aid in law enforce-
ment and to minimize the opportunities for crime. The average
citizen is ceaselessly warned to remove keys from automobiles.
. In addition, auto manufacturers are persuaded to install spe-
cial locking devices and buzzer alarms, and real estate develop-
ers, residential communities, and industrial areas are asked to
install especially bright lights to deter the criminally inclined.110
Other precautions may also involve citizens banding together and
undertaking steps for their mutual protection through the creation
of so-called neighborhood "crime-watch" programs.
On the other hand, the plaintiffs in cases such as Isaacs v.
Huntington Memorial Hospital,"' Gomez v. Ticor"2 and Cohen
v. Southland Corp.113 essentially demanded that private citizens
assume law enforcement functions. However, police protection is,
and should remain, a governmental, not a private obligation. Rec-
ognition of this governmental duty is clearly evidenced by legisla-
tive declaration 14 and by the enactment of financial indemnity
109. See supra note 9 and accompanying text.
110. Kline v. 1500 Massachusetts Avenue Apartment Corp., 439 F.2d 477, 484
(D.C. Cir. 1970).
111. 38 Cal. 3d 112, 695 P.2d 653, 211 Cal. Rptr. 356 (1985).
112. 145 Cal. App. 3d 622, 193 Cal. Rptr. 600 (1983).
113. 157 Cal. App. 3d 130, 203 Cal. Rptr. 572 (1984).
114. CAL PENAL CODE § 13900 (Deering 1980) provides:
The Legislature finds and declares:
(a) That crime is a local problem that must be dealt with by state and local gov-
ernments if it is to be controlled effectively.
(b) That criminal justice needs and problems vary greatly among the different
local jurisdictions of this state.
(c) That effective planning and coordination can be accomplished only through the
direct, immediate and continuing cooperation of local officials charged with gen-
eral governmental and criminal justice agency responsibilities.
(d) That planning for the efficient use of criminal justice resources requires a per-
manent coordinating effort on the part of local governments and local criminal
justice and delinquency prevention agencies.
[Vol. 23
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statutes to assist injured victims of violent crime.1 15 Certain rela-
tionships do justify the imposition on private individuals of a duty
to protect.116 This is especially so where the peacekeeping opera-
tions of municipal police are effectively hindered by the land-
owner's use of his property and where the victim is particularly
vulnerable and dependent on the landowner who has power over
his welfare and safety. Not all relationships, however, implicate
these distinguishing elements. Given the wide ranging circum-
stances that may exist in cases involving landowners and occupiers
and the analytical complexity in determining which setting justi-
fies a protective duty,11 7 there is clearly a definite need for better
guidance than that presently offered by the judiciary.
Harper and Kime postulate that the social policies which deter-
mine what relationships require special assurances of safety "re-
flect the general attitude of the community." 1 8 Yet, the judicial
branch of government is making adjustments, implicated by fast-
changing social circumstances, without the guidance of the very
body created to debate and decide social questions, the legislature.
According to the Report of the California Citizen's Commission
on Tort Reform:119
Given the limitations of the case-by-case process and the limited
opportunity for broad social analysis that it provides, it is not
surprising that policy-making in the tort area has had a fitful,
lurching quality. The fault here is not in our judges, but primar-
ily in the failure of the rest of the policy-making mechanism to
address the questions pressed upon the judiciary, and to provide
sensible and authoritative answers.1 20
To date, California has no statute which establishes the condi-
tions that give rise to an affirmative duty on the part of an owner
115. See CAL. GOV'T CODE §§ 13959-13969.1 (Deering 1982 & Supp. 1987) which
provides for reparation to crime victims from the state-sponsored Restitution Fund and
prescribes the procedures by which a crime victim may apply for financial assistance.
116. See supra notes 49-59 and accompanying text.
117.
Human beings by their activities have all sorts of dealings with each other and
come into all sorts of relations. Some of these are tenuous, and to them the law
attaches no special obligations. Others are regarded as of sufficient importance to
require for a sound and stable social order certain assurances of safety to person
and property on the part of the parties thereto. The social policies which deter-
mine what relationships require such special assurance and what ones are suffi-
ciently unimportant not to require them are so incredibly complicated as almost to
defy analysis. These policies in the main reflect the general attitude of the commu-
nity; they represent for the most part the popular notions of what constitutes
proper assumptions on the part of one person when dealing with another.
Harper & Kime, supra note 3, at 904.
118. Id.
119. REPORT, supra note 23.
120. Id. at 142
19871
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or occupier of land to come to the aid of or provide protection to
his visitors. The only provision directly relevant is almost 114
years old and provides in pertinent part that "[e]very one is re-
sponsible ... for an injury occasioned to another by his want of
ordinary care or skill in the management of his property or per-
son," except so far as the injured person contributes to his own
injury. 121 The California Supreme Court has deemed this section
a continuation of the common law and thus has made it the foun-
dation of California negligence law. 22 However, Rowland v.
Christian and its progenies have failed to provide acceptably ra-
tional guidance on the issue of "third party" premises liability.
Nevertheless, California's highest tribunal has made clear that
any departure from the fundamental principle enunciated by sec-
tion 1714 of the Civil Code must be clearly supported by public
policy.123 Thus far, the only statutory reaction to the court's ex-
pansion of liability has been the 1978 amendment to section 1714
wherein the legislature abrogated the California Supreme Court's
dram shop 24 liability decisions.1 25 Those decisions had overturned
the holding of Cole v. Rush12e that "as to a competent person it is
the voluntary consumption, not the sale or gift, of intoxicating li-
quor which is the proximate cause of injury from its use ....127
The new principle created was that one who furnished alcoholic
beverages to an intoxicated person who subsequently injured an-
other could be held liable for those injuries.
In 1978, the California Legislature amended Civil Code section
1714128 (and Business and Professions Code section 25602129) to
create a broad statutory immunity against civil liability for social
hosts who furnish alcoholic beverages to any person.130 These
121. CAL CIv. CODE § 1714(a) (Deering Supp. 1987). See also supra note 20 and
accompanying text.
122. Rowland v. Christian, 69 Cal. 2d 108, 112, 443 P.2d 561, 568, 70 Cal. Rptr.
97, 104 (1968).
123. Id.
124. "Many states have Dram Shop or Civil Liability Acts which impose liability on
the seller of intoxicating liquor.., when a third party is injured as a result of the intoxica-
tion of the buyer where the sale has caused or contributed to such intoxication." BLACK'S
LAW DiCTIONARY 444 (5th ed. 1979). California, however, created similar liability by case
law. See infra note 125.
125. For examples of court-created Dram Shop liability, see Vesely v. Sager, 5 Cal.
3d 153, 486 P.2d 151, 95 Cal. Rptr. 623 (1971) (tavern owner held liable); Bernhard v.
Harrah's Club, 16 Cal. 3d 313, 546 P.2d 719, 128 Cal. Rptr. 215, cert. denied, 429 U.S.
859 (1976) (out-of-state tavern owner held liable); Coulter v. Superior Court, 21 Cal. 3d
144, 577 P.2d 669, 145 Cal. Rptr. 534 (1978).
126. 45 Cal. 2d 345, 289 P.2d 450 (1955).
127. Id. at 356, 289 P.2d at 457.
128. See CAL CIv. CODE § 1714(a) (Deering Supp. 1987).
129. CAL Bus. & PROF. CODE § 25602 (Deering Supp. 1987).
130. The 1978 amendments added subdivisions (b) and (c) to Civil Code § 1714:
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amendments effectively reinstated the prior common law as ex-
pressed in Cole.
An argument has been made that the California decisions sup-
porting civil liability of third persons for negligently failing to pro-
vide protection to crime victims contravene the basic legislative
policy established in the 1978 amendments to Civil Code section
1714. This policy holds that "intentional acts causally supersede
negligent acts when both contribute to a person's injury." '131 As
one commentator has concluded:
Although it might be said that the legislature addressed itself
only to the narrow area of dram shop liability when reinstating
the common law rule that voluntary or intentional acts are the
proximate cause of injuries in third party cases, such an inter-
pretation is unduly restrictive. In dram shop liability, it is the
negligence of the voluntarily intoxicated person that results in
injury to another. In the criminal violence situations, however, it
is the violent act of the criminal that intentionally causes injury
to the victim. The legislature's statement that a person's volun-
tary act in becoming intoxicated is the proximate cause of any
reasonably foreseeable consequences, therefore, should apply
with greater weight to the willful acts of criminals and the in-
tended consequences of their acts.
The dram shop liability area represents extreme judicial ex-
pansion met with rare and radical legislative curtailment. Al-
(b) It is the intent of the Legislature to abrogate the holdings in cases such as
Vesely v. Sager (5 Cal. 3d 153), Bernhard v. Harrah's Club (16 Cal. 3d 313), and
Coulter v. Superior Court ([21] Cal. 3d [1447]) and to reinstate the prior judicial
interpretation of this section as it relates to proximate cause for injuries incurred
as a result of furnishing alcoholic beverages to an intoxicated person, namely that
the furnishing of alcoholic beverages is not the proximate cause of injuries result-
ing from intoxication, but rather the consumption of alcoholic beverages is the
proximate cause of injuries inflicted upon another by an intoxicated person.
(c) No social host who furnishes alcoholic beverages to any person shall be held
legally accountable for damages suffered by such person, or for injury to the per-
son or property of, or death of, any third person, resulting from the consumption
of such beverages.
The 1978 amendments also added subdivisions (b) and (c) to Business and Professions
Code § 25602:
(b) No person who sells, furnishes, gives, or causes to be sold, furnished, or given
away, any alcoholic beverage pursuant to subdivision (a) of this section shall be
civilly liable to any injured person or the estate of such person for injuries inflicted
on that person as a result of intoxication by the consumer of such alcoholic
beverage.
(c) The Legislature hereby declares that this section shall be interpreted so that
the holdings in cases such as Vesely v. Sager (5 Cal. 3d 153), Bernhard v. Har-
rah's Club (16 Cal. 3d 313) and Coulter v. Superior Court ([21] Cal. 3d [1447])
be abrogated in favor of prior judicial interpretation finding the consumption of
alcoholic beverages rather than the serving of alcoholic beverages as the proximate
cause of injuries inflicted upon another by an intoxicated person.
The constitutionality of the 1978 amendments was upheld in Cory v. Shierloh, 29 Cal. 3d
430, 629 P.2d 8, 174 Cal. Rptr. 500 (1981).
131. Note, supra note 2, at 536.
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though the legislature's amendment of Civil Code section 1714
weighs heavily against judicial expansion of any third party lia-
bility, the uniqueness of the legislature's action intimates that a
well-reasoned approach to third party cases that imposes ra-
tional limits to liability could escape legislative scrutiny. Thus,
the lesson to be learned from California's experience in dram
shop liability is that the courts should be very reluctant to ex-
tend third party civil liability for criminal violence. If extensions
are warranted, the court's decisions should be legally sound, per-
suasive, and limited in scope.132
Unfortunately, the trend to expand the liability of landowners
continues to gain momentum in the absence of specifically control..
ling legislation. Given the increased tendency of lawyers to file a
legal action when there is substantial uncertainty or lack of uni-
formity in the law,133 the current approach to "third party" prem-
ises liability for criminal violence clearly is not the best instru-
ment of social policy. Landowners and occupiers, particularly
those in high crime areas, have good reason to entertain feelings
of paranoia and doubt concerning their rights and responsibilities.
Practical questions necessarily include: What circumstances will
give rise to a protective duty? What types of relationships will
impose a higher duty of protection? Since protection costs
money,13 how would a business operating on a small profit mar-
gin fulfill its obligation in a high-crime area? If business owners
absorb the high cost of protection by raising the price of their
goods and services, how will the poor (who most often reside in
areas where the incidence of crime is greatest) be able to meet
their basic needs given the minimal financial resources available
to them? In all practicality, would they not be singled out as the
ones to pay for their own police protection? Would it not be more
economical for businesses to close their doors and relocate to
"safer ground"? If so, how would indigent members of that com-
munity who lack adequate means of transportation be able to ob-
tain needed goods and services?
Other practical concerns were addressed in Goldberg v. Hous-
ing Authority3 5 in which Chief Justice Weintraub of the New
132. Id. at 540.
133. REPORT, supra note 23, at 132.
134. The utilization of a private security force
must take into account not only the normal expenses inherent in an employer-
employee relationship--compensation, social security, and workmen's compensa-
tion-but also additional expenditures that would be required because of the na-
ture of the task-high insurance payments, incidental expenses such as advertising
costs incurred in recruiting personnel, and costs for equipment such a uniforms,
weapons, and ... communications equipment.
Note, supra note 45, at 1193 (footnote omitted).
135. 38 N.J. 578, 186 A.2d 291 (1962).
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Jersey Supreme Court wrote:
[I]t is fairly simple to decide how many ushers or guards suffice
at a skating rink or a railroad platform to deal with the crush of
a crowd and the risks of unintentional injury which the nature of
the business creates, but how can one know what measures will
protect against the thug, the narcotic addict, the degenerate, the
psychopath and the psychotic? Must the owner prevent all
crime? We doubt that any police force in the friendliest comrnu-
nity has achieved that end. How then can the owner know what
is enough to protect ... persons and property?"'3
Although Goldberg addressed the specific context of landlords
and tenants, the concerns expressed are equally relevant to situ-
ations involving other landowners and occupiers.
Not only would there be uncertainty as to when the duty to
furnish police protection arises and as to what measures will dis-
charge the duty, there would also be exceptional uncertainty with
respect to the issue of causation. This is so because of the ex-
traordinary speculation inherent in the subject of deterrence of
men bent upon criminal ventures. It would be quite a guessing
game to determine whether some unknown thug of unknowable
character and mentality would have been deterred if the owner
had furnished some or some additional policemen. It must be
remembered that police protection does not, and cannot, provide
assurance against all criminal attacks, and so the topic presup-
poses that inevitably crimes will be committed notwithstanding
the sufficiency of the force. Hence the question of proximate cause
is bound to be of exceptional difficulty.137
The current approach to "third party" premises liability for
criminal violence may even entail concerns of constitutional di-
mension. As alluded to above, merchants and consumers who op-
erate and reside in economically depressed areas where crime is
most prevalent may very well constitute that segment of the citi-
zenry which will have to bear the burden of providing for their
own police protection. Note also that the governmental duty to
provide police protection and to provide financial assistance to in-
jured victims of violent crime has been clearly recognized by the
California legislature.138 Arguably, these legitimate state func-
tions cannot be accomplished under the constitution13 9 at the ex-
pense of one particular group of people. In other words, when the
government-here the judicial branch-seeks to charge the cost of
136. Id. at 589-91, 186 A.2d at 297.
137. Id.
138. See supra notes 114-15 and accompanying text.
139. The fourteenth amendment of the United States Constitution provides that no
state shall "deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws."
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operation of a state function, conducted for the benefit of the pub-
lic, to a particular class of persons, it is denying its citizens equal
protection of the laws.140
CONCLUSION
The issue of "third party" premises liability for criminal vio-
lence is one which calls out for legislative attention. "The social
and economic costs inflicted by the absence of a general definition
of the circumstances that create a legal duty of care are simply
too great to ask the citizen to pay. 141 Legislative guidelines for
ascertaining the existence of an affirmative duty of security pro-
tection in this context should delineate criteria that explore the
degree of power, control, submission and dependence in a given
relationship.
Such criteria might include:
1. The extent to which the landowner's premises are accessible
to state and municipal law enforcement personnel. This factor
may be instrumental in distinguishing the average merchant from
the owner of a large, enclosed shopping mall or the landlord of a
single family dwelling from the owner of a multidwelling apart-
ment complex.
2. The degree of power and control the landowner has over the
security and welfare of his guests. Visitors who are under supervi-
sion might be more likely to be apprised of impending criminal
conduct sooner than those who are not. Moreover, those who are
encouraged to move about freely on the premises might be more
vulnerable to criminal attack than those who are confined to cer-
tain areas or are forced to congregate with others.
3. The extent to which the visitor relinquishes his right of self-
protection to the landowner. This may be determined by ascer-
taining the guest's motive for entering the premises. In turn,
knowledge of the visitor's motive may shed light as to his expecta-
tions regarding protection against crime. For example, one who
checks into a motel is likely to expect more protection than an-
other who drives into a service station to purchase gasoline.
140. See, e.g., In re Jerald C., 36 Cal. 3d 1, 6, 678 P.2d 917, 919, 201 Cal. Rptr.
342, 344 (1984) (citing tenBroek, California's Dual System of Family Law; Its Origins
and Development and Present Status, 17 STAN. L. REv. 614, 639 (1965): "To charge the
cost of operation of state functions conducted for public benefit to one class of society is
arbitrary and violates the basic constitutional guarantee of equal protection of law .... ;
Department of Mental Hygiene v. Kirchner, 60 Cal. 2d 716, 723, 388 P.2d 720, 724, 36
Cal. Rptr. 488, 492 (1964), remanded 380 U.S. 194 (1965), subsequent opinion at 62 Cal.
2d 586, 400 P.2d 321, 43 Cal. Rptr. 329 (1965).
141. REPORT, supra note 23, at 154.
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4. The extent to which the visitor makes independent arrange-
ments for his personal security. Evidence in this regard might be
indicative of a mutual agreement between landowner and visitor
as to the level of protection to be provided by the former.
5. Whether the means of entering and exiting the premises are
limited and under the exclusive control of the landowner. A find-
ing of a special relationship is more likely where the visitor's free-
dom of action and access to safety is restricted.
6. The period of time the relationship is to exist. This may be
helpful in ascertaining the parties' expectations concerning the na-
ture of protective measures to be implemented.
Additionally, it is imperative that the proper role of the test of
foreseeability be defined. Specifically, foreseeability should not be
equated with mere likelihood and should only determine the scope
of a preexisting duty that is based on the nature and character of
the relationship involved. Thus, depending on the degree of
probability of a criminal occurrence on the premises, a protective
duty might entail a mere warning or might necessitate the hiring
of trained security personnel.
The foregoing recommendations are not comprehensive but nev-
ertheless are intended to provide a starting point for a more ra-
tional analysis of the duty issue in this area of law. The California
judiciary has taken an ambiguous approach, making landowners
unable to predict their legal responsibilities. They will undoubt-
edly remain in this precarious position until guiding legislation is
enacted.
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